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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
John Doe I and John Doe II were evaluated on an 
emergency basis pursuant to Pennsylvania Mental Health 
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Procedures Act (MHPA) Section 302 and were found in need 
of inpatient treatment.  Section 6105(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania 
Uniform Firearms Act (PUFA) prohibits “[any] person who 
has been . . . committed to a mental institution for inpatient care 
and treatment under [MHPA] [S]ection 302” from possessing 
firearms.  The Does challenge PUFA § 6105(c)(4)’s 
constitutionality on its face.  They argue that it deprives those, 
who are certified committable under MHPA § 302, of their 
Second Amendment rights without procedural due process.  
For the reasons below, we hold that the Does have failed to 
raise a proper challenge to Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme.  
We will therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. 
A very brief sketch of the facts is necessary to provide 
context for the Does’ claim.  Doe I was certified committable 
in 2011 after he became depressed and his mother took him to 
an emergency room for an emergency evaluation.  Doe II was 
certified committable in 1996 after police brought him to a 
hospital upon learning that he had threatened to harm himself.  
Both Does’ commitment certification records were reported to 
and recorded in the Pennsylvania Instant Check System and the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
databases.  As a result, they were prohibited from purchasing 
firearms when they later attempted to do so.   
 
The Does filed this action in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that PUFA § 
6105(c)(4) is facially unconstitutional because it deprives all 
those, who are committed under MHPA § 302, of their Second 
Amendment rights without procedural due process.  The 
District Court denied the Does’ Motion for Summary 
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Judgment and granted summary judgment to the Pennsylvania 
defendants.  It held that although those committed under 
MHPA § 302 have a protected liberty interest in the right to 
bear arms, PUFA § 6105(c)(4) provides sufficient procedural 
protections before depriving them of their Second Amendment 
rights.  The Does appealed.1 
 
II. 
Because the Does mount a facial, rather than an as-
applied challenge, we begin with the relevant statutes.   
 
MHPA § 301(a) defines those who may be required to 
undergo involuntary emergency examination and mental 
health treatment.  It provides that “[w]henever a person is 
severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate 
treatment,” he “may be made subject to involuntary emergency 
examination and treatment.”2  This section further provides 
that a “person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result 
of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, 
judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social 
relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened 




1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review grants of summary judgment de novo.  Foehl v. United 
States, 238 F.3d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 2001). 
2 50 Pa. C.S. § 7301(a). 
3 Id.  (emphasis added). 
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“Clear and present danger” is determined in accordance 
with MHPA § 301(b).  Under that provision, a clear and present 
danger to others exists if, within the past thirty days, the person 
being evaluated has “inflicted or attempted to inflict serious 
bodily harm on another” and is reasonably likely to do so 
again.4  Clear and present danger can also be established if a 
person is a danger to himself.  Such a danger exists if any of 
three situations has arisen within the past thirty days:  (1) the 
person has been unable to care for himself such that, absent 
adequate treatment, “death, serious bodily injury or serious 
physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days”; (2) the 
person “has attempted suicide” and, absent adequate treatment, 
is reasonably likely to commit suicide; or (3) the person has 
engaged in substantial actual or attempted self-mutilation and, 
absent adequate treatment, actual self-mutilation is reasonably 
probable.5 
 
MHPA § 302 authorizes emergency examinations “at a 
treatment facility upon the certification of a physician stating 
the need for such examination,” upon a warrant issued by the 
county mental health administrator, or “upon application by a 
physician or other authorized person who has personally 
observed conduct showing the need for such examination.”6  A 
person taken to a facility for this purpose “must be examined 
by a physician within two hours of arrival” to determine 
whether he “is severely mentally disabled . . . and in need of 
immediate treatment.”7  Only individuals who are found by an 
examining physician to be “severely mentally disabled” and to 
 
4 Id. § 7301(b)(1).   
5 Id. § 7301(b)(2). 
6 Id. § 7302(a). 
7 Id. § 7302(b).   
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pose a “clear and present danger of harm” to themselves or 
others can be involuntarily committed pursuant to MHPA § 
302.8 
 
Once a person is certified committable under MHPA § 
302, section 6105(c)(4) of PUFA automatically prohibits him 
from owning or possessing firearms.  This restriction under 
Pennsylvania law also applies to deprive individuals of their 
gun rights under federal law.9  Pennsylvania does, however, 
provide three post-deprivation remedies to those who seek 
recovery of their firearm rights:  (1) a determination by a court 
that an applicant is not a risk to himself or others,10 (2) a 
challenge to the accuracy of the mental health record,11 and (3) 




The Does argue that they and all others, who have been 
prohibited from possessing firearms under PUFA § 6105(c)(4) 
and MHPA § 302, have been stripped of a protected liberty 
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment:  their Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.  The Second Amendment 
 
8 Id. § 7301(b)(a). 
9 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(c)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).   
10 Id. § 6105(f)(1).  Relief under this statute would also result 
in restoration of firearm rights under federal law.  See U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives, ATF Form 321012, Certification of Qualifying 
Relief from Disabilities Program (March 2016). 
11 18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(e). 
12 Id. § 6111.1(g)(2). 
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states:  “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed.”13  In District of Columbia v. 
Heller, the Supreme Court determined that at the “core” of the 
Second Amendment is the right of “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”14  The 
Court in Heller emphasized, however, that there are 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” that can restrict 
that right, and that the Court was decidedly not “cast[ing] doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill.”15  
 
We have consistently hewed to the exceptions that 
Heller preserved.16  As we stated in Beers v. Att’y Gen. United 
States, 17 to determine whether a category of people is excluded 
from the Second Amendment under Heller, “we look at the 
historic, traditional justifications for barring a class of 
individuals from possessing guns.”  In Beers, we held that the 
plaintiff lacked a right to bear arms because he was part of “the 
 
13 Id. amend. II. 
14 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  And the right applies to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).   
15 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
16 See, e.g., Binderup v. 
Attorney General United States of America, 836 F.3d 336, 
347-48 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d 85, 89-92 (3d Cir. 2010). 
17 927 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated on other grounds, 





historically-barred class of mentally ill individuals who were 
excluded from Second Amendment protection.”18  In 
configuring the “historically-barred class,” we concluded that 
it consists of “individuals who were considered dangerous to 
the public or to themselves.”19 
 
As to who is vested with authority to determine that one 
is a danger to oneself or the public, and on what grounds that 
person may do so, we now make explicit what was implicit in 
Beers, that we defer to the relevant statute’s reasonable 
standards and designations.  The relevant statute in Beers was 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which prohibits firearm possession in 
instances where one has been determined “a danger to himself 
or others” “as a result of . . . mental illness.”20  In Beers we 
deferred to § 922(g)(4) and to MHPA §§ 302–04, under which 
the plaintiff had been involuntarily committed, in concluding 
that he was a danger to himself or others as a result of mental 
illness.21   
 
In the case at bar, PUFA § 6105(c)(4) and MHPA § 302 
are the relevant statutes for determining that an individual is a 
danger to himself or others as a result of mental illness; it is to 
these statutes that we defer.  We find no reason to second-guess 
the adequacy of Pennsylvania’s requirement under MHPA § 
302 that a physician determine that one is a danger to himself 
or others as a result of mental illness and is “severely mentally 
disabled . . . and in need of immediate treatment.”  Thus, once 
a person has been involuntarily committed under MHPA § 302, 
 
18 Id. at 157.   
19 Id.   
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
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that person has joined the class of those historically without 
Second Amendment rights. 
 
Left without a Second Amendment right, the Does can 
make only two challenges.  They can challenge MHPA § 302 
on procedural due process grounds—that is, that MHPA § 302 
provides inadequate procedure before involuntarily 
temporarily committing someone.  Or they can challenge 
PUFA § 6105(c)(4) on substantive Second Amendment 
grounds—that is, that involuntary temporary commitment does 
not fall under Heller’s mental illness exception and therefore 
PUFA § 6105(c)(4) is substantively unconstitutional.  The 
Does have made it expressly clear that they are bringing neither 
challenge.22  In presenting an appeal, parties must formulate 
the correct challenge on their own and brief us accordingly.  
“[W]e will not manufacture arguments [for them].”23  
 
IV. 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court, granting defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment.  
 
22 Pet. Br. 17, 20-21.   
23 Guatay Christian Fellowship v. Cty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d 
957, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (first alteration “[w]” in original; the 
change to “[W]” is added here.) (quoting Greenwood v. FAA, 
28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
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John Doe I, et al. v. Governor of Pennsylvania, et al., No. 19-
1927 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
The majority affirms the District Court’s opinion on the 
basis that the Does have failed to raise a proper challenge to 
Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme. To come to that conclusion, 
my colleagues hold that “once a person has been involuntarily 
committed under MHPA § 302, that person has joined the class 
of those historically without Second Amendment rights.” Maj. 
Op. III. However, I believe that the issue of whether Section 
302 committees retain their Second Amendment right to 
possess firearms is a close question. Because we do not need 
to reach this issue in order to decide the case before us, it is, as 
a matter of judicial restraint, best left for another day. 
Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s reasoning 
and concur in the judgment only. I would affirm the District 
Court on less contentious grounds: that, assuming without 
deciding that Section 302 committees retain their Second 
Amendment right to possess firearms—and thus have a 
protected liberty interest—there is no Fourteenth Amendment 
violation because the State’s post-deprivation procedures 
provide Section 302 committees adequate due process. 
The Does argue that PUFA § 6105(c)(4) is facially 
unconstitutional because it deprives them, and all other 
similarly situated individuals, of the right to bear arms without 
due process of law. They sought a declaration that PUFA § 
6105(c)(4) violates Fourteenth Amendment procedural due 
process as to those whose only disqualifying event is that they 
were certified committable under MHPA § 302. 
We use a two-pronged analysis to evaluate whether a 
law violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
The court must ask whether there is a protected life, liberty, or 
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property interest at stake, and if so, whether the procedures 
afforded amount to “due process of law.” Robb v. City of 
Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Bd. of 
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972)). 
Therefore, we would normally begin our analysis by evaluating 
the asserted protected liberty interest. However, the Supreme 
Court has warned that when confronted with difficult 
questions, we should “confine ourselves to deciding only what 
is necessary to the disposition of the immediate case.” 
Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 349 U.S. 366, 373 (1955); 
see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 
U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding 
principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid 
reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of 
deciding them.”); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 
288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“It is not the habit 
of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless 
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.” (citation 
omitted)).  
Because Pennsylvania’s post-deprivation procedures 
provide Section 302 committees with adequate due process, 
regardless of whether the Does have a protected liberty 
interest, we need not decide in this case whether they retain a 
Second Amendment right to possess firearms.  
Assuming, then, that the Does have a protected liberty 
interest, the question becomes whether the procedures afforded 
amount to “due process of law.” Robb, 733 F.2d at 292. The 
Does first contend that they are entitled to pre-deprivation 
procedures before being permanently deprived of their Second 
Amendment rights. However, such procedures are not 
constitutionally required in every case. “[T]he Supreme Court 
‘has recognized, on many occasions, that where a State must 
act quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide 
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predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.’” Nat’l Amusements 
Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 62 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997)). In 
Gilbert, for example, the Court held that a police officer 
arrested on drug charges was not entitled to notice and a 
hearing prior to being suspended without pay because of the 
state’s significant interest in the officer’s immediate 
suspension. 520 U.S. at 932-34.  
To determine what procedures the Constitution requires 
in a particular case, including whether pre-deprivation 
procedures are required and whether post-deprivation 
procedures are constitutionally adequate, a court must consider 
three factors:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail. 
 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
As noted, I assume, under the first factor, that a Section 
302 committee has a protected liberty interest in the right to 
bear arms. The other factors, however, weigh in favor of 
finding that pre-deprivation procedures are not necessary in 
this case. As to the second factor, risk of erroneous deprivation 
is low because a Section 302 committee had to have posed a 
“clear and present danger” to himself or others at the time of 
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his commitment. A physician would have had to examine the 
individual, and only if the physician makes this determination 
is the individual committed under Section 302. Furthermore, 
additional pre-deprivation safeguards have little value here. 
The District Court aptly observed, for example, that “[n]othing 
in [PUFA § 6105(c)(4)] suggests that only Section 302 
committees on the more dangerous or severe end of the mental 
health spectrum are subject to the firearms prohibition. Thus, a 
hearing to determine where a Section 302 committee falls on 
that spectrum is not relevant to the statutory scheme and has no 
value.” J.A. 38. Finally, the third factor also weighs against the 
necessity of a pre-deprivation hearing. Pennsylvania has a 
prevailing interest in public safety and ensuring that potentially 
dangerous individuals are not permitted to own deadly 
weapons. 
Thus, as two of the three Mathews factors weigh against 
the Does, in my view the District Court correctly concluded 
that Section 302 committees’ due process right does not require 
pre-deprivation procedures. 
The Does next argue that, even if pre-deprivation 
remedies are not constitutionally required here, the available 
post-deprivation remedies are constitutionally inadequate. 
There are three post-deprivation procedures available to an 
individual who seeks to lift the firearm restriction imposed by 
PUFA § 6105(c)(4) as a result of a Section 302 commitment. 
First, an individual can file a petition in the Court of Common 
Pleas, asserting that he is no longer mentally ill and should be 
allowed to own a gun. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(f)(1). Both 
state and federal firearm rights are restored “if the court 
determines that the applicant may possess a firearm without 
risk to the applicant or any other person.” Id. This process 
allows for a full evidentiary hearing in the Court of Common 
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Pleas at which both parties have the right to present evidence 
and cross-examine witnesses. 
The predominant thrust of the Does’ argument was that 
there is no meaningful due process because PUFA § 6105(f)(1) 
cannot undo the federal firearms disqualification. However, 
since July 1, 2019, relief under this provision also results in 
restoration of firearm rights under federal law. See U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives, ATF Form 321012, Certification of Qualifying 
Relief from Disabilities Program (March 2016). 
Second, an individual can seek to have his Section 302 
commitment expunged by “petition[ing] the court to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the commitment was 
based.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6111.1(g)(2). Successful 
expungement under this section results in the restoration of 
both state and federal firearms rights. 
Third, an individual can submit a challenge to the 
Pennsylvania State Police that contests the accuracy of his or 
her mental health record. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6111.1(e). “If the 
challenge is ruled invalid,” the individual has “the right to 
appeal the decision to the Attorney General” of Pennsylvania, 
at which point an Administrative Law Judge will hold a 
hearing de novo. Id. § 6111.1(e)(3). The Administrative Law 
Judge’s decision may be appealed to the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court. Id. § 6111.1(e)(4). 
Where a state provides adequate post-deprivation 
remedies, it does not violate the Due Process Clause. Parratt 
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538–39 (1981), overruled on other 
grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). PUFA’s 
three post-deprivation remedies are adequate because they 
satisfy the Mathews test.  
A Section 302 committee’s liberty interest (which is 
assumed for my purposes here) must be weighed against the 
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state’s strong interest in public safety and, hence, in proceeding 
cautiously before permitting individuals who once “pose[d] a 
clear and present danger” to reacquire firearms. 50 Pa. Stat. § 
7301(a). Given that the risk of erroneous deprivation is low and 
that the value of additional procedural safeguards is negligible 
in this case, the balance weighs against the Does. The risk of 
erroneous deprivation can still be low even if not every 
questioned deprivation is undone—there may be real reasons 
for not restoring every Section 302 committee’s firearms 
rights. According to Pennsylvania State Police statistics, forty-
one Section 302 committees pursued restoration through one 
of the three available post-deprivation procedures in 2017. Of 
that number, seventeen individuals were successful. It is also 
no longer the case that a successful PUFA § 6105(f) petitioner 
cannot have his federal rights restored. See ATF Form 321012. 
Thus, there is nothing “permanent” about PUFA § 6105(c)(4), 
as the Does suggest. Appellants’ Br. 40. 
As the District Court correctly determined that the three 
post-deprivation procedures satisfy due process, there is no 
Fourteenth Amendment violation, and I would affirm on that 
basis. 
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment affirming 
the District Court.  
